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I. INTRODUCTION
Alexander Boni-Saenz’s most recent article, Sexuality and Incapacity,
challenges the normative foundations of legal incapacity doctrines in the
context of sexual decision-making of older adults with cognitive disabilities.1
* Acting Professor of Law and Martin Luther King Jr. Hall Research Scholar, U.C.

Davis School of Law; J.D., Yale Law School; A.B., Dartmouth College. Many thanks to
Dean Kevin R. Johnson and Senior Associate Dean for Academic Affairs Madhavi Sunder
for their institutional support; to Dean Kevin R. Johnson and Robert D. Dinerstein for their
helpful comments; to Wynter K. Miller for her excellent research assistance; and to the
OSLJ editors.
1 See generally Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Sexuality and Incapacity, 76 OHIO ST. L.J.
1201 (2015). I use the term “older adults” in line with the movement away from “elderly”
and other terms that signify the frailty of this population. See, e.g., Times Have Changed;
What
Should
We
Call
‘Old
People’?,
NPR
(Feb.
6,
2016),
http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=465819152
[https://perma.cc/8FFX-P6TL] (discussing the least disliked descriptor for a person over
sixty-five years old and declaring “older adults” as the winner).
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Sexuality and Incapacity reimagines the foundations of legal incapacity
doctrine in the context of sexual assault. Boni-Saenz is guided by principles of
Martha Nussbaum’s “capabilities approach” to human development2 and the
nascent theory and practice of supported decision-making (SDM), which is “a
series of relationships, practices, arrangements, and agreements, of more or
less formality and intensity, designed to assist an individual with a disability to
make and communicate to others decisions about the individual’s life.”3 This
normative shift more accurately reflects the consultative, relational manner in
which almost all people (those with and without disabilities) make decisions—
with support from trusted friends, advisors, and family members.
Boni-Saenz constructs a three-step functional test for legal capacity—what
he calls “cognition-plus.” The test has two relatively familiar components and
a third novel addition: (1) a threshold question of volition (can the person
express a preference free from coercion?); (2) a question of understanding
(does the person possess the cognitive capabilities to understand the nature and
consequences of a sexual decision?); and (3) a question of the existence of an
“adequate” support network.4 A person who lacks the cognitive capabilities
identified in (2) may still be found legally capable if an “adequate” network of
trusted supporters exists who can facilitate sexual decision-making.5
Cognition-plus offers administrable elements to address concerns about
expansive judicial discretion under a test previously advanced by Deborah
Denno, known as the “contextual approach.”6
2 Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities and Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 273,

279–85 (1997); see also Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development
Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2821, 2877–78 (2006) (applying Nussbaum’s capabilities
approach to intellectual property globalization); William W. Fisher & Talha Syed, Global
Justice in Healthcare: Developing Drugs for the Developing World, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
581, 639–44 (2007) (citing Nussbaum’s capabilities approach in support of recognizing a
human right to health); Robin West, Rights, Capabilities, and the Good Society, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 1901, 1922–26 (2001) (applying Nussbaum’s capabilities approach to
argue for state protection against private violence and a right to provide care to
dependents).
3 Robert D. Dinerstein, Implementing Legal Capacity Under Article 12 of the UN
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: The Difficult Road From
Guardianship to Supported Decision-Making, 19 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 8, 10 (2012). Such
contractual options allow a person to indicate will and preferences in advance of a time of
diminished capacity and perhaps prevent the need for a future, formal court determination
of incapacity.
4 Boni-Saenz, supra note 1, at 1234–36.
5 Id. at 1236.
6 Compare Deborah W. Denno, Sexuality, Rape, and Mental Retardation, 1997 U.
ILL. L. REV. 315, 355–57 (1997) (outlining her “contextual approach” for legal capacity
that “focusses on the situational context and particular circumstances of each case” along
with current research), with Boni-Saenz, supra note 1, at 1221 (noting that Denno’s “openended flight to context” may create more uncertainty as it “widens the factual inquiry by
the court”), and Peter Margulies, Identity on Trial: Subordination, Social Science
Evidence, and Criminal Defense, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 45, 60–61 (1998) (arguing for a
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The addition of SDM as an alternative means of demonstrating legal
capacity expands the possibilities for greater sexual access for people with
cognitive disabilities. The use of SDM challenges existing sociopolitical
beliefs in autonomous decision-making as the ideal.7 It shifts the analysis of
legal incapacity from a focus on individual cognitive deficiencies to an
examination of the sufficiency of external supports and resources available to
the individual.8 In cases of cognitive impairment, the lack of external support
itself generates legal incapacity. Boni-Saenz’s discussion of “sexual
capability” rebrands sex as a positive good;9 as a result, inclusion requires that
people with cognitive disabilities be considered part of a broader sexual
minority.10
This Response analyzes three aspects of Boni-Saenz’s cognition-plus test.
First, I position his normative and prescriptive proposals within an existing,
robust conversation regarding legal capacity, SDM, and the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). Scholars of
international human rights law offer valuable insights on challenges of
redefining legal capacity and implementing SDM. Advocates continue to

narrower test because expanding the contextual frame of criminal law often “perpetuates
stereotypes that subordinate entire groups”). Denno focuses on cases where persons with
intellectual or developmental disabilities were victims of sexual assault. Denno, supra, at
315.
7 Jonathan Herring, Entering the Fog: On the Borderlines of Mental Capacity, 83
IND. L.J. 1619, 1620 (2008) (“For those who possess legal capacity, the cardinal principle
is the right of self-determination or autonomy.”); see also Nancy J. Knauer, Defining
Capacity: Balancing the Competing Interests of Autonomy and Need, 12 TEMP. POL. &
C.R. L. REV. 321, 325 (2003) (arguing that the American legal system implicitly endorses
“abstract principles of autonomy”). The fact that diverse areas of the law assign liability for
activities undertaken without the requisite consent also suggests a broad normative
judgment in favor of individual autonomy. See id. at 322–23 & nn.2–14 (noting a capacity
requirement in a variety of contexts, ranging from medical treatment to marriage and
divorce to jury duty).
8 See Boni-Saenz, supra note 1, at 1230–32.
9 See id. at 1224–25.
10 See Herring, supra note 7, at 1625 (noting that “while notions of competence
purport to be neutral, these notions in fact reflect majority interests and values” such that
“[w]omen and ethnic minorities remain particularly vulnerable to assessments that they
lack mental capacity”); Shelia Jennings, Reflections on Personhood: Girls with Severe
Disabilities and the Law, 2 CANADIAN J. DISABILITY STUD. 55, 58 (2013) (“[P]atriarchy
and racism have denied legal personhood to certain individuals and groups.”); see also KIM
E. NIELSEN, A DISABILITY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, at xii (2012) (“African
Americans, immigrants, gays and lesbians, poor people, and women have been defined
categorically as defective citizens incapable of full civic participation.”). For further
discussion of A Disability History of the United States, see Alison M. Parker, Intersecting
Histories of Gender, Race, and Disability, 27 J. WOMEN’S HIST. 178, 178–79 (2015)
(reviewing NIELSEN, supra, and agreeing that “what people perceive to be ‘disabilities’
changes over time and is socially constructed”).
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debate and contest SDM as a practical, administrable, and measurable
alternative.11
Second, I identify potential normative implications of incorporating SDM
into domestic law, specifically for procedural and evidentiary law. Third,
Boni-Saenz applies his test to the case of older adults with dementia in State v.
Rayhons.12 I question a comparable application of cognition-plus to people
with more severe intellectual and developmental disabilities (ID/DD) who are
currently precluded from exercising sexual agency but may have the mental
capability to do so.13 Boni-Saenz’s taxonomy of cognitive disabilities uses the
onset of incapacity to distinguish “persistent acquired incapacity” from
“persistent lifelong incapacity.”14 In his article, the former group is older
adults while the latter have experienced intellectual and developmental
disabilities since birth or early childhood, with no prior period of unimpaired
cognitive functioning.15 This distinction matters with respect to assessing
sexual decisions. I offer a number of factors unique to persons with ID/DD for
Boni-Saenz to consider as he further develops cognition-plus.

II. SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING IN CONTEXT
SDM represents a significant departure from existing proxy decisionmaking practices.16 Although Boni-Saenz relies on SDM in his proposed
doctrinal model, his discussion of SDM’s evolution in international human
rights law is underemphasized, particularly in light of the expanding literature
in this area. This Part situates Boni-Saenz’s analysis within existing
conversations regarding universal legal capacity pursuant to the CRPD.

A. The U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities:
From Substitute Decisions to Decisional Support
Human rights scholar, Amita Dhanda, describes three dominant
constructions of legal capacity: a status attribution test, a functional test, and
an outcome test.17 Status attribution equates the presence of disability
11 See, e.g., Peter Bartlett, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities and the Future of Mental Health Law, 8 PSYCHIATRY 496, 497–98 (2009)
(presenting a more skeptical view of the future of SDM in the United Kingdom).
12 Boni-Saenz, supra note 1, at 1249–53.
13 See generally Jasmine E. Harris, The Dignity of Sexual Agency: Regulating Risk
and Mental Disability (Sept. 12, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).
14 Boni-Saenz, supra note 1, at 1212–13.
15 Id. at 1212.
16 Dinerstein, supra note 3, at 8 (“[T]his use of the word ‘support,’ and the related
concept of supported decision making, represents nothing less than a ‘paradigm shift’ away
from well-established but increasingly discredited notions of substituted decision making.”
(footnote omitted)).
17 Amita Dhanda, Legal Capacity in the Disability Rights Convention: Stranglehold of
the Past or Lodestar for the Future?, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 429, 431–32 (2007);
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(physical, mental, intellectual, or psychosocial) with a presumption of legal
incapacity.18 Under a functional test, the presence of disability does not
necessarily result in a finding of legal incapacity; rather, the person is deemed
incapable if, because of her disability, she cannot perform a specific task or
make a specific decision.19 The outcome test uses a socially disfavored
outcome or decision as evidence that the person with a disability is incapable
of rational decision-making.20 Dhanda argues that all three operate “in
principle or in practice” as status attribution tests, and rely primarily on
forensic psychologists to evaluate individuals’ (in)ability to reason using
standardized assessments such as IQ scores.21
The assessments Dhanda lays out favor risk aversion over decisional
agency and, as a result, restrict people with cognitive disabilities in a way that
constrains their human rights.22 Reform efforts have focused on increasing due
process protections and the reliability of assessment tools in adjudicating legal
capacity but generally do not challenge the normative baseline and
assumptions, at least not in the United States.23 The functional test has become
the modern standard and first emerged during the late twentieth century.24
In practice, the functional test conflates legal capacity with mental
capacity. Legal personhood (defined in the CRPD as “legal capacity”)
recognizes an individual’s right to utilize courts and adjudicatory institutions
as a means of protecting or exercising rights and responsibilities.25 In this
sense, legal personhood resembles legal standing. Alternatively, mental
capacity is narrower, functional, and asks the question whether the person has
see also Comm. on the Rights of Perss. with Disabilities, General Comment No. 1 (2014),
Article 12: Equal Recognition Before the Law, para. 15, at 4, U.N. Doc. CRPD/C/GC/1
(Apr. 2014) [hereinafter General Comment No. 1] (discussing the three types of legal tests
for capacity).
18 Dhanda, supra note 17, at 431.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 431–32.
21 Id. at 433.
22 See id.
23 Id. at 433–35; see also István Hoffman & György Könczei, Legal Regulations
Relating to the Passive and Active Legal Capacity of Persons with Intellectual and
Psychosocial Disabilities in Light of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities and the Impending Reform of the Hungarian Civil Code, 33 LOY. L.A. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 143, 158 (2010) (noting that in the United States and other Western nations,
legal systems emphasized bans on discrimination and focused on ensuring equal
opportunities versus challenging baseline constructions of capacity); cf. E. Lea Johnston,
Representational Competence: Defining the Limits of the Right to Self-Representation at
Trial, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 523, 527 n.26, 531 n.55, 583 n.341 (2011) (discussing case
law in the context of self-representation and noting that courts rely on the Due Process
Clause for representation determination decisions).
24 Eilionóir Flynn & Anna Arstein-Kerslake, The Support Model of Legal Capacity:
Fact, Fiction, or Fantasy?, 32 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 124, 127 (2014).
25 See G.A. Res. 61/106, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, art.
12 (Dec. 13, 2006) [hereinafter CRPD].
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the cognitive ability to understand and appreciate a decision—e.g., marital,
sexual, financial, medical.26 Legal capacity, then, should vary according to the
nature of the decision and the gravity of the potential consequences.27
The CRPD reflects a significant paradigm shift away from the functional
test to a full recognition of universal legal capacity.28 A central debate among
international human rights scholars concerns the meaning and scope of
Article 12 and SDM, specifically, whether legal capacity includes both the
capacity for rights (passive possession of the right) as well as the capacity to
act (active, meaningful exercise of the right).29 During the treaty deliberation
process, this distinction inspired much debate and contestation among state
parties.30 Generally, state actors agreed that people with disabilities should
have rights to legal personhood, but diverged with respect to whether the law
would and should recognize an individual’s capacity to act when and if he or
she could not do so independently without support. Permitting a person who
lacks the mental capacity to make a decision and act upon it to retain that right
instead of designating a substituted decision-maker challenged deeply rooted
conceptions of choice and agency. As Amita Dhanda explained, there are two
models:
One recognizes that all persons have legal capacity and the other
contends that legal capacity is not a human attribute. . . . [T]he first
choice does not mean that it is also being contended that all human
beings in fact possess similar capacities. Even as all human beings are
being accorded similar value, the differences between them [are] not
being ignored or devalued. The second, on the other hand, recognizes
the fact that there are some human beings who do not possess legal
capacity and hence can be declared incompetent. One system is

26 See Boni-Saenz, supra note 1, at 1209–10.
27 See generally CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT DEPRIVE

PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 186–88 (2006) (discussing the
Supreme Court’s decision in Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993), and noting that
competency varies according to the special decision and the stakes; for example, a criminal
defendant’s competence to plead guilty varies from that required to participate in his
representation and trial); Paul S. Appelbaum, Assessment of Patients’ Competence to
Consent to Treatment, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED., 1834, 1836 (2007) (describing the “sliding
scale” concept of legal capacity as reflective of its functional nature).
28 CRPD, supra note 25, art. 12 (“State Parties shall recognize that persons with
disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life.”).
29 See, e.g., Dhanda, supra note 17, at 452–56; Dinerstein, supra note 3, at 8–9
(noting that the footnote in Article 12 of the CRPD differentiating between the two was
ultimately excluded from the final text but that the deliberation and drafting process was
nonetheless significant).
30 See Dhanda, supra note 17, at 438–56 (discussing the sequence of drafts that
emerged as reflective of conflicting views regarding how to define legal capacity and what
responsibility state parties would have for providing individual decision-making support).
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premised on the universal presence of competence; the other on the
selective presence of competence.
....
With the recognition of universal capacity, there is . . . . a claim of
equality of opportunity but difference of treatment . . . .31
The latter “exclusionary model” of legal capacity segregates those with
significant mental disabilities, for whom the current standard of legal capacity
is unattainable.32
Dhanda’s clarification that a shift to universal legal capacity does not
mean that everyone has the same set of capabilities (and, consequently, the
level of support for decisional agency will vary according to the capabilities an
individual does possess and the decision at hand) represents a crucial
distinction. Legal capacity is better understood as a continuum of capabilities
and a cross-sectional axis of different types of decisions or conduct. The
provision of decision-making supports or accommodations depends on the
intersection of the two axes.
The CRPD model accounts for even the most severely disabled person
who may require full support from a third party; however, two things
distinguish it from the current functional approach using substituted decisionmaking systems such as guardianship. First, the principle of universal legal
capacity recognizes a person with severe disabilities as a legal person with
rights, responsibilities, and recourse.33 Second, it preserves the person’s
central role in the decision-making process, calling on the third party to make
her best approximation of the will and preferences of the person with a
cognitive disability based on actual knowledge about the person, prior
interactions, and the existence of an ongoing relationship.34
31 Id. at 457–58 (emphasis added).
32 See id. at 460.
33 CRPD, supra note 25, art. 12.
34 General Comment No. 1, supra note 17, para. 21, at 5 (“Where, after significant

efforts have been made, it is not practicable to determine the will and preferences of an
individual, the ‘best interpretation of will and preferences’ must replace the ‘best interests’
determinations. This respects the rights, will and preferences of the individual, in
accordance with article 12, paragraph 4. The ‘best interests’ principle is not a safeguard
which complies with article 12 in relation to adults. The ‘will and preferences’ paradigm
must replace the ‘best interests’ paradigm to ensure that persons with disabilities enjoy the
right to legal capacity on an equal basis with others.”); see also Canadian Ass’n for Cmty.
Living, Response to Draft General Comment No. 1 on Article 12, U.N. Committee on the
Rights
of
Persons
with
Disabilities,
at
5
(Feb.
26,
2014),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CRPD/GC/CanadianAssociationCommunityLiving_
Ar12.doc [https://perma.cc/ZN5R-ZLE3] (“In recognizing the reality of such situations, we
recommend that GC advance the notion of ‘best interpretation of will and preference’ to
replace the best interest test for application in these situations. Such a test would recognize
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The terms of the CRPD do not formally apply to the United States at this
time, owing to the fact that the U.S. Senate has twice failed to ratify the treaty,
although the country is a signatory to it.35 Boni-Saenz—like international legal
scholar Amita Dhanda36—recommends a normative shift to a notion of sexual
capabilities, rooted in Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen’s theory of “human
capabilities.”37 While this proposal reflects a shift in theory in line with
international human rights norms, Boni-Saenz’s approach does not recognize
universal legal capacity. Reliance on a model of exclusion means that some
cadre will still be stripped of legal personhood if, for example, they cannot
pass the threshold requirement of expressing volition verbally or through
conduct. Boni-Saenz’s approach reflects an interim compromise, adding depth
to the functional test and drawing attention to the benefits of SDM without
going as far as the CRPD.
The “stickiness”38 of norms of substitute decision-making should not be
underestimated and are intimately connected with the historical invisibility of
that will and preference cannot always be interpreted with certainty, but that there are
always better interpretations than others.”).
35 Strong opposition to the CRPD’s ratification has come from conservative groups,
such as the Heritage Foundation and the Family Research Council, who argue that the
CRPD challenges U.S. sovereignty, as well as strips parents of children with disabilities of
their decisional authority and gives it to state authorities. Josh Rogin, Senate GOP Rejects
U.N.
Disabilities
Treaty,
FOREIGN
POL’Y
(Dec.
4,
2012),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/12/04/senate-gop-rejects-u-n-disabilities-treaty
[https://perma.cc/8NW9-GNXG]; see also Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities Before the S. Foreign Relations Comm., 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Sen.
Robert J. Dole), http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Senator_Dole_Testimony.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4KJS-V5SA] (noting that the treaty fell just five votes short of passage the
previous year because “treaty opponents expressed concern that the CRPD would diminish
American sovereignty”); id. (statement of the Hon. Tom Ridge, Chairman, National
Organization on Disability), http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Ridge_
Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YBE-LT5N] (voicing disappointment “following last
year’s failure to ratify the treaty” and pleasure at revisiting the issue).
36 Dhanda, supra note 17, at 435–38 (describing a “capabilities” approach and the
utility of this normative approach to legal incapacity).
37 Boni-Saenz, supra note 1, at 1223–33; accord Nussbaum, supra note 2, at 275–77
(describing the development of the “capabilities approach” and distinguishing it from
Amartya Sen’s approach).
38 Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem,
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 609 (2000) (explaining the failure of overly harsh legal sanctions,
or “hard shoves,” as means to shift social norms in contrast to “gentle nudges” designed to
delicately prod social norms in the direction of change); see also Richard H. McAdams,
Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 10 (1992) (distinguishing individual absolute
preferences from individual relative preferences, i.e., those preferences influenced by the
preferences of “others,” in the context of market consumption); Cass R. Sunstein,
Choosing Not to Choose, 64 DUKE L.J. 1, 10–11 (2014) (discussing the difficulties inherent
in active choice models versus substituted decision-making and other default rules); Cass
R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 929 (1996) (noting
that “social norms can make people act and talk publicly in ways that are different from
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people with intellectual and developmental disabilities.39 Scholars have called
for the use of SDM networks (both formal and informal) as viable alternatives
to legal determinations of incapacity and appointment of surrogate decisionmakers through vehicles such as guardianship and conservatorship.40
Article 12 of the CRPD makes the shift to universal legal capacity in four
steps: (1) a formal declaration of the right of people with disabilities to
universal legal capacity; (2) a legal mandate that state parties “recognize that
persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in
all aspects of life;” (3) a second requirement that states take affirmative,
“appropriate measures to provide access . . . to the support [needed to]
exercis[e] . . . legal capacity;” and (4) due process safeguards to protect against
abuse.41 State disagreement regarding the proper scope of Article 12 reflected
significant confusion over the meaning of legal capacity and its deserved
recipients. To make this paradigm shift, a state must explicitly recognize the
right to and exercise of legal capacity irrespective of the degree of support one
might need to do so. The CRPD, therefore, is “not just a legal document, but
also a political document, and as such, its message on the legal capacity of an
excluded community should be unequivocal and forward looking.”42
The principle law reform efforts and experiences with SDM occur in other
countries, such as Canada, Ireland, Sweden, India, and others.43 A total of five
provinces in Canada now use SDM systems, such as legally enforceable
“representation agreements,” as effective contractual alternatives to

how they actually think” and that “[p]eople often act in accordance with norms that they
wish were otherwise or even despise”).
39 See Jasmine E. Harris, Processing Disability, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 457, 468–72
(2015) (discussing the historical roots of current normative presumptions of incapacity
associated with people with mental disabilities).
40 See generally Leslie Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship (Again): Substituted
Decision Making as a Violation of the Integration Mandate of Title II of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 157, 157 (2010) (“[I]t would be preferable to
support decision making rather than supplant it through guardianship”).
41 CRPD, supra note 25, art. 12.
42 Dhanda, supra note 17, at 447–48. Much of the international debate today turns on
the timing of the implementation of the CRPD’s move to universal legal capacity. Some
states contend that the move to universality must occur over time and requires normative
shifts to take shape, and guardianship as an institution will continue to operate, albeit on a
limited basis; other advocates call for the prompt deconstruction of guardianship entirely as
a form of substituted decision-making. See, e.g., Kristin Booth Glen, Changing Paradigms:
Mental Capacity, Legal Capacity, Guardianship, and Beyond, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 93, 146–47 (2012) (discussing British Columbia’s move towards SDM by use of
“representation agreements”).
43 See, e.g., Flynn & Arstein-Kerslake, supra note 24, at 133–37 (discussing reforms
of legal capacity statutes and doctrine in Ireland, Canada, and India); see also Robert D.
Dinerstein et al., Emerging International Trends and Practices in Guardianship Law for
People with Disabilities, 22 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 435, 436 (2016) (exploring “the
recent history of guardianship in international law”).

92

A RESPONSE TO ALEXANDER BONI-SAENZ

[2016

guardianship.44 On March 16, 2016, the Israeli Knesset passed an amendment
to the existing Legal Capacity and Guardianship Law adding a provision for
SDM as the least restrictive means to decisional agency.45 Furthermore, the
Bulgarian National Assembly soon will decide the fate of the Natural Persons
and Support Measures Bill, designed to abolish guardianship and bring
Bulgaria in line with the CRPD.46 Domestically, Texas is the first state to
statutorily recognize SDM agreements as legitimate alternatives to
guardianship.47
Although the United States has yet to see a domestic judicial decision
based solely on the principles of Article 12 of the CRPD or SDM,48 at least
44 KRISTA JAMES & LAUREN WATTS, LAW COMM’N OF ONT., UNDERSTANDING THE
LIVED EXPERIENCES OF SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING IN CANADA 4 (Mar. 2014),
http://www.lco-cdo.org/capacity-guardianship-commissioned-paper-ccel.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DN22-JTCS] (listing British Columbia, Yukon, Alberta, Manitoba and
Saskatchewan as provinces with experience using SDM); see also MICHAEL BACH & LANA
KERZNER, LAW COMM’N OF ONT., A NEW PARADIGM FOR PROTECTING AUTONOMY AND
THE RIGHT TO LEGAL CAPACITY 53 (Oct. 2010), http://www.lco-cdo.org/disabilitiescommissioned-paper-bach-kerzner.pdf [https://perma.cc/NQG2-LPCB] (“British Columbia’s
Representation Agreement Act has been hailed by the disability community as highly
successful legislative recognition of supported decision-making.” (emphasis omitted));
LANA KERZNER, PAVING THE WAY TO FULL REALIZATION OF THE CRPD’S RIGHTS TO
LEGAL CAPACITY AND SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING: A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE 37 (Apr.
2011), http://supporteddecisionmaking.org/sites/default/files/paving_the_way_for_crpd_canada.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3BLY-LCWA] (describing the purposes of the Representation Agreement
Act).
45 Capacity and Guardianship (Amendment No. 18) Law, 5776-2016, § 67B (Mar. 16,
2016), translated in http://bizchut.org.il/en/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/new-Israeli-lawon-supported-decision-making.docx [https://perma.cc/X7DP-F6NE] (adding section 67B
defining a decision-making supporter, limiting her role and duties, and establishing the
“express interest” standard as the guiding principle of SDM).
46 Oliver Lewis, Why Should Bulgaria Change Its Guardianship System?, OLIVER
TALKS (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.mdac.info/en/olivertalks/2016/03/14/why-shouldbulgaria-change-its-guardianship-system
[https://perma.cc/34QG-G6UR].
Latvia,
Lithuania, and Czech Republic are also in the process of adopting SDM. See MDAC’s
Recent Legal Capacity Advocacy Activities in Lithuania, Bulgaria and in Hungary,
MENTAL DISABILITY ADVOC. CTR. (Oct. 15, 2012), http://www.mdac.info/en/16/10/2012
/MDAC_s_recent_legal_capacity_advocacy_activities_in_Lithuania_Bulgaria_and_in_Hu
ngary [https://perma.cc/N9X4-5FFT].
47 Supported Decision-Making Agreement Act, TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1357 (West
2015). Legislators passed House Bill 39 and Senate Bill 1881 during the 84th Texas
Legislative Session in 2015. Id.
48 Flynn & Arstein-Kerslake, supra note 24, at 138 (“We have not yet seen the full
application of Article 12 in a judicial decision.”); see also Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491,
504 (2008) (stating that international law commitments do not function as binding federal
law); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 353–54, 353 n.4 (2006) (holding that legal
interpretations by international courts deserve “respectful consideration” but are not
binding and do not necessarily have effect as federal law). But cf. Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 575–76 (2005) (acknowledging the relevance of the views of the international
community and that “the Court has referred to the laws of other countries and to
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one state court judge has discussed SDM’s conceptual and practical import as
an alternative to guardianship.49 In the case of In re Guardianship of Dameris
L., Judge Kristin Booth Glen connected federal and state constitutional
principles of substantive due process with international human rights—
specifically, the CRPD—in support of her decision to revoke guardianship of a
twenty-nine-year old woman, Dameris, with an intellectual disability.50 Judge
Glen reasoned that “where a person with an intellectual disability has the
‘other resource’ of decision making support, that resource/network constitutes
the least restrictive alternative, precluding the imposition of a legal
guardian.”51
In Dameris’s case, Judge Glen concluded that the evidence demonstrated
that she had the mental and adaptive abilities to “exercise her legal capacity, to
make and act on her own decisions, with the assistance of a support
network.”52 Thus, the judge determined that “[t]erminating the letters of
guardianship previously granted to [Dameris’s husband and mother]
recognizes them, instead, as persons assisting and supporting her autonomy,
not superseding it.”53
Legal scholars have argued that the use of SDM models is not aspirational
or benevolent; rather, current reliance on substituted decision-making vehicles
(such as the very institution of legal guardianship) violates Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act’s integration mandate.54
international authorities as instructive”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003)
(citing the European Convention on Human Rights and decisions by the British Parliament
and the European Court of Human Rights as indicative of prevailing norms).
49 See, e.g., In re Guardianship of D.D., 19 N.Y.S.3d 867, 871 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2015)
(citing In re Guardianship of Dameris L., 956 N.Y.S.2d 848, 856 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2012))
(stating that “supported decision making must be explored and exhausted before
guardianship can be imposed”); see also Court Order, Ross v. Hatch, No.
CWF120000426P-03 (Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 2, 2013); Theresa Vargas, Woman with Down
Syndrome Prevails Over Parents in Guardianship Case, WASH. POST (Aug. 2, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/woman-with-down-syndrome-prevails-over-parents-inguardianship-case/2013/08/02/4aec4692-fae3-11e2-9bde-7ddaa186b751_story.html
[https://perma.cc/J8B5-NFQQ] (describing a case in which a judge rejected a guardianship
request from the parents of a woman with Down syndrome).
50 In re Guardianship of Dameris L., 956 N.Y.S.2d at 855–56.
51 Id. at 856.
52 Id.
53 Id. Courts in other countries have used a similar rationale. See Stanev v. Bulgaria,
2012-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 81, 147 (citing the CRPD and noting “the growing importance which
international instruments for the protection of people with mental disorders are now
attaching to granting them as much legal autonomy as possible”); Shtukaturov v. Russia,
2008-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 353, 356–58 (finding that the legal incapacitation of petitioner,
Shtukaturov, violated Article 6, the right to a fair trial, Article 8, the right to privacy, and,
for the subsequent involuntary hospitalization, the right to liberty and to petition the court
for relief).
54 Leslie Salzman, Guardianship for Persons with Mental Illness—A Legal and
Appropriate Alternative?, 4 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 279, 314 (2011); Salzman,
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B. Normative Implications of Supportive Decision-Making in U.S. Law
SDM reflects a significant normative shift in the structure of AngloAmerican conceptions of legal rights and responsibilities, yet, in the spirit of
legal realism, better reflects the everyday decision-making of people with and
without disabilities. Although SDM more accurately reflects decisional
agency, the current normative framework of legally recognized decisions is
built around an individual decision-maker and the rights and responsibilities
that attach to a particular decision. Thus, a shift in the normative framework
requires a conversation about the implications of such a shift more broadly.
I have explored the implications of SDM in court procedures and rules
such as rules for discovery—e.g., interrogatories, admissions, and declarations.
How should the law recognize responses produced with the assistance of
another person? Furthermore, SDM would require evidentiary reforms to
account for the decision-making model—e.g., evidentiary rules including
burdens of proof and related presumptions, hearsay, character evidence, and
conceptions of “unavailability.” The very presence of a supporter would
challenge the four core testimonial qualities that define evidence law—
memory, perception, sincerity, and narration.55
Beyond procedural and evidentiary rules, consider the “meeting of the
minds” required for the valid formation of a contract. Contract law principles
reflect a meeting of the minds of two individuals.56 How would the law
account for the third party supporter in terms of the formation, execution, and
enforceability of the contractual terms and obligations? Could the existence of
a support network suffice for contract formation?57 A key question concerns

supra note 40, at 160; see Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 589 (1999)
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)) (“The statute as a whole is intended ‘to provide a clear
and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities’”).
55 See FED. R. EVID. 601 advisory committee’s note (noting admissibility of materials
“bearing upon the perception, memory, and narration of witnesses”).
56 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“An
agreement is a manifestation of mutual assent on the part of two or more persons.”
(emphasis added)). Note that corporations are legal persons under the law and can enter
into enforceable contracts. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.02 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2005)
(“[E]very corporation has . . . the same powers as an individual to do all things necessary
or convenient to carry out its business and affairs, including without limitation power . . . to
make contracts . . . .”).
57 See Terry Carney & Fleur Beaupert, Public and Private Bricolage—Challenges
Balancing Law, Services and Civil Society in Advancing CRPD Supported DecisionMaking, 36 UNSW L.J. 175, 187–88 (2013) (discussing the potential contractual and
fiduciary obligations that might arise in the context of a SDM agreement); Glen, supra note
42, at 146–47 (exploring “representation agreements” and their use and enforceability by
disabled and aging persons to manage routine affairs, including financial transactions,
health care decisions, legal services, “and other areas of personal care”); Michael Wald &
Eli D. Pierce, Elder Ethics: How Supported Decision-Making Could Protect Incapacitated
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the existence of a non-cognitive-based account for will and preferences.58
What would this look like and would it be acceptable? How would SDM work
in the context of informed consent in health law or for participation in research
studies?59 The answers are beyond the scope of this Response but worthy of
exploration if we are committed to using SDM systems.

III. APPLICABILITY OF COGNITION-PLUS TO PERSONS WITH
INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES
Boni-Saenz applies his cognition-plus test to older adults with dementia
and uses the case of former Iowa state representative, Henry Rayhons, to
illustrate the mechanics of his test.60 He makes the claim that his test applies to
people with persistent cognitive disabilities more broadly, which includes
people with intellectual and developmental disabilities.61 There are certainly
similarities and overlap between the effects of cognitive impairments on older
adults and persons with intellectual disabilities.62 This Part, however,
discusses the differences between individuals who currently lack cognitive
abilities and those who have never had them, and how these differences
challenge the broader applicability of cognition-plus. I do not suggest that
cognition-plus is inapplicable to people with intellectual disabilities, but rather
that Boni-Saenz may wish to account for these differences in either design or
application of his proposed doctrinal test.

Seniors, 79 TEX. B.J. 104, 105 (2016) (discussing the use of SDM to aid seniors who are
not considered incapacitated in making financial and other life decisions).
58 See Telephone Interview with Robert D. Dinerstein, Professor of Law and Dean for
Experiential Learning, Am. Univ. Wash. Coll. of Law (Apr. 15, 2016).
59 See Sandra Berkowitz, Informed Consent, Research, and the Elderly, 18
GERONTOLOGIST 237, 242 (1978) (noting the risks inherent in allowing third party
decision-making in the gerontology context); Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel,
Proxy Decision Making for Incompetent Patients: An Ethical and Empirical Analysis, 267
JAMA 2067, 2069 (1992) (discussing the “family rights” argument wherein “the family
deserves recognition as an important social unit that ought to be treated . . . as a responsible
decisionmaker in matters that ultimately affect its members”); Alan Meisel, Managed
Care, Autonomy, and Decisionmaking at the End of Life, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 1393, 1422
(1999) (noting that family members are often involved in the medical decision-making
process “under the aegis of the substituted judgment standard”).
60 Boni-Saenz, supra note 1, at 1247–53.
61 Id. at 1243–44 (distinguishing cognition-plus from existing sexual incapacity
doctrines and emphasizing its benefits particularly with respect to individuals with
persistent cognitive impairments).
62 People with intellectual disabilities are more susceptible to dementia later in life.
Learning
Disabilities
and
Dementia,
ALZHEIMER’S
SOC’Y
1,
https://www.alzheimers.org.uk/site/scripts/documents_info.php?documentID=103
[https://perma.cc/74U7-RK2K] (last updated Mar. 2015) (“People with learning
disabilities, particularly those with Down’s syndrome, are at increased risk of developing
dementia.”).
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A. Volition
Boni-Saenz establishes a threshold test of volition that focuses on whether
the person with “persistent cognitive impairments still has the capacity to
express volition.”63 The goal of this step is to establish whether the person can
express will and preferences,64 not a factual determination of whether volition
actually existed in the case before the court. He accounts for both verbal and
non-verbal means of expressing volition, such as facial expressions, and the
comorbid presentation of communication impairments and cognitive
disabilities.65 If the individual is unable to express will and preferences,
according to Boni-Saenz, he lacks the capacity to consent to sex, and liability
would attach to his sexual partner.66
People with intellectual or developmental disabilities may have a
particularly difficult time getting past the threshold test when they
communicate through non-normative methods. Consider a recent Ninth Circuit
decision, United States v. James, in which the court reversed the trial judge’s
decision to acquit after the jury returned a guilty verdict on federal charges of
sexual abuse of a “severely disabled” woman.67 The statute prohibits sexual
intercourse with a person the defendant knows is “physically incapable of
declining participation in, or communicating unwillingness to engage in, that
sexual act.”68
Judge Tallman, writing for the majority, discusses the sufficiency of
evidence supporting T.C.’s, the victim’s, inability to communicate volition
under the statute: (1) “witnesses—even those who knew her well—could not
always understand T.C.;” (2) “the evidence demonstrated [T.C. and the
defendant] never spent any appreciable time together before [the defendant]
sexually assaulted her. Nothing indicates he knew her well enough to
understand her or could otherwise understand her attempts at communication;”
(3) although she communicated through head nodding, biting, or other nonverbal indicators, “the evidence demonstrated that [T.C.] had difficulty
communicating even with her longtime caregivers, close family members, the
emergency room nurse, and investigators;”69 (4) the defendant’s statement that
T.C. “just lay there” during the alleged assault; and (5) that T.C. was unable to

63 Boni-Saenz, supra note 1, at 1234.
64 Id. at 1235.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 United States v. James, 810 F.3d 674, 676, 683 (9th Cir. 2016). This case involved

an alleged rape on the Fort Apache Indian Reservation. Id. at 677. The federal government,
and not the state of Arizona, had jurisdiction to indict and try the defendant pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 2242(2)(B). Id.
68 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2)(B) (2006) (emphasis added).
69 For example, T.C. did not communicate with the treating nurse in the emergency
room after the alleged attack. James, 810 F.3d at 682.
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care for herself, “groom,” or walk independently.70 Judge Tallman concludes
his opinion with an editorial statement somewhat removed from the legal
question in this case yet apropos of his decision: “The law in its majesty
protects from assault those who are too weak and feeble to protect themselves.
No society worthy of being called civilized may do any less.”71 Judge Tallman
saw T.C.’s disability, and its physical and behavioral manifestations, as
evidence of her helplessness and vulnerability sufficient for a jury to convict
the defendant.
Judge Kozinski, the sole dissenter, draws attention to the statutory
language that established the prosecutorial burden to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that T.C. was physically incapable of communicating her
unwillingness to engage in sex.72 Judge Kozinski dismisses the majority’s
evidence as irrelevant, nothing more than “a number of facts that are pretty
much beside the point and . . . cannot overcome the solid wall of evidence that
T.C. was capable of communicating her lack of consent when she was so
inclined.”73 Furthermore, he notes that T.C.’s need for assistance with personal
care was also irrelevant to the statutory inquiry.74 Judge Kozinski foretells of
potentially disastrous effects of the majority’s holding to people with
disabilities and atypical communication methods:
The majority claims that its holding “does not preclude someone
suffering from a physical disability from ever having consensual
sexual intercourse.” I’m not so sure. James will go to prison, likely for
many years, because he had sex with someone whose physical
handicap impaired her ability to communicate, even though those who
knew her testified that she could physically convey the idea of “no”
when she wanted to. Today’s opinion will make others more reticent
about engaging in sex with people who are physically impaired. Their
already difficult task of seeking out a partner for sexual gratification
will become even more daunting.
. . . T.C. herself, for example, will never have sex again; who’d be
foolish enough to risk it?75
The James case supports skepticism that those with communication
impairments will be able to overcome even the most basic threshold test for
volition. Sadly, I suspect People v. Miranda, cited in Boni-Saenz’s article,76 is

70 Id.
71 Id. at 683.
72 Id. at 684 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
73 Id. at 686.
74 Id. at 687.
75 James, 810 F.3d at 687 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
76 Boni-Saenz, supra note 1, at 1235 n.166.
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more likely the exception, and United States v. James is more reflective of
courts’ analyses of volition.

B. Knowledge and Consequences
A majority of courts employ some version of the “knowledge and
consequences” test that asks whether the person has the cognitive capacity to
reason about a specific sexual decision.77 Boni-Saenz advances a more
nuanced vision of this test that accounts for the dangers of requiring
knowledge of moral or social consequences of a sexual decision.78 He calls for
a minimal understanding of the individual’s right to choose whether to consent
or not.79 Surpassing this doctrinal hurdle requires an assessment of what
people with intellectual disabilities know.80 This is a function of asking wellformulated questions as well as deciding, as a baseline, what is important for
them to know with respect to a particular decision.81
People with intellectual and developmental disabilities present at least
three unique challenges in meeting this test.82 First, as an evidentiary matter,
this prong of the functional test often turns on an expert assessment of
intelligence as a proxy for reasoning and knowledge. Most rape and sexual
assault cases today, where the alleged victim is a person with an intellectual
disability, rely on the testimony of a court-appointed or party-appointed
forensic psychologist.83 The expert administers one of several IQ tests based
on one or two interviews with the person with ID/DD to ultimately produce a
composite, numerical reflection of intelligence.84 While IQ tests have an
77 Id. at 1216–22.
78 Id. at 1234–53.
79 Id. at 1230–33.
80 See id.
81 See id.
82 I recognize the internal diversity within the population of people with intellectual

and developmental disabilities, and use the aggregate terms to facilitate a discussion about
persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities, such as autism or cerebral palsy,
who may share some degree of mental impairment related to their disabilities.
83 Dhanda, supra note 17, at 432 (“[J]udges arrive at decisions of incompetence
relying upon medical experts opining as to the presence or absence of disability.”); see,
e.g., Ely v. State, 384 S.E.2d 268, 268 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that court-ordered
psychological evaluation by expert, which included IQ testing, was relevant in determining
victim’s ability to consent); People v. Whitten, 647 N.E.2d 1062, 1065 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)
(citing victim’s IQ score and mental health expert’s testimony in finding of victim’s
inability to consent); People v. McMullen, 414 N.E.2d 214, 215 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)
(considering testimony of psychologist that victim had IQ scores below the average range
for finding of victim’s ability to consent); People v. Cratsley, 653 N.E.2d 1162, 1164 (N.Y.
1995) (using an IQ test to establish female victim’s moderate retardation in sexual assault
case); People v. Easley, 364 N.E.2d 1328, 1330–31 (N.Y. 1977) (considering school
psychologist’s testimony and victim’s IQ scores to determine victim’s capacity to consent).
84 In 1905, French psychologist Alfred Binet and medical student Theodore Simon
published the first Binet-Simon scale, a test meant to identify children with intellectual,
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adaptive measure built in, they are focused primarily on measuring cognitive
and adaptive deficits rather than strengths in those areas.85 The danger in
moving to the functional test has been an overreliance on expert testimony and
medical diagnostic evidence without assessing evidence of adaptive
capabilities rather than deficits. Without more, the functional test becomes a
status attribution model of legal capacity.
Second, a history of exclusion from meaningful, inclusive public
education and involuntary institutionalization has contributed to significant
structural deficiencies in sex education. Even those public schools that require

mental, or psychosocial disabilities. Trisha Imhoff, Alfred Binet, MUSKINGUM C. (May
2000), http://www.muskingum.edu/~psych/psycweb/history/binet.htm [https://perma.cc/WXA3LU93]. The scale’s purpose was to determine a child’s most appropriate educational
setting. Jenifer P. Marom, Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale, ENCYCLOPEDIA MENTAL
DISORDERS, http://www.minddisorders.com/Py-Z/Stanford-Binet-Intelligence-Scale.html
[https://perma.cc/5MDA-5ZZQ]. The Binet-Simon test produced an identifiable numerical
score and a conclusion regarding the mental age of the individual in comparison to her
chronological age. Alfred Binet & TH. Simon, New Methods for the Diagnosis of the
Intellectual Level of Subnormals, 12 L’ANNÉE PSYCHOLOGIQUE 191, 191–244 (1905),
reprinted in THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE IN CHILDREN 37–90 (Elizabeth S. Kite
trans., 1916). Today, IQ assessments include more than the Binet-Simon test—the
Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale is the Binet-Simon test’s modern equivalent and is in its
fifth iteration. Gale H. Roid, Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scales, HOUGHTON MIFFLIN
HARCOURT
(2003),
http://www.hmhco.com/hmh-assessments/other-clinicalassessments/stanford-binet [https://perma.cc/E63C-EVYD]. Today, there are a multitude of
different intelligence tests—e.g., the Woodcock Johnson III test, Differential Ability Scales
(DAS-II), the Universal Nonverbal Intelligence test, the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for
Children (WISC-V), etc. See Erica Patino, Types of Intelligence and Achievement Tests,
UNDERSTOOD.ORG
(June
5,
2014),
https://www.understood.org/en/schoollearning/evaluations/types-of-tests/types-of-intelligence-and-achievement-tests
[https://perma.cc/7F7F-7PW4].
85 Definitions of ID/DD have evolved over time and, most recently, reflect the
adaptive components of ID/DD that determine the extent of supports needed. This is the
product of questions concerning the validity of IQ tests, particularly for those with atypical
communication methods. See IQ Testing in Individuals with Intellectual Disability, U.C.
DAVIS HEALTH SYS. (June 18, 2015), http://www.ucdmc.ucdavis.edu/welcome/features
/2014-2015/06/20150618_IQ-testing-Hessl.html
[https://perma.cc/66W9-24XN].
All
standard IQ tests, for example, have a “floor,” or a level below which they are unable to
measure cognitive functioning. Individuals with intellectual disabilities often “have a
cumulative (or Full Scale) IQ that is below what the test can measure . . . . But a floored
score doesn’t tell you anything about their true abilities.” Id.; see also Frequently Asked
Questions on Intellectual Disability, AM. ASS’N ON INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES (2013), https://aaidd.org/intellectual-disability/definition/faqs-on-intellectualdisability#.VxNGOkf3gco
[https://perma.cc/M4AY-QQ9M]
(defining
intellectual
disability as a function of both cognitive and adaptive measures that account for both
strengths and limitations and urging evaluators to consider such criteria as “community
environment typical of the individual’s peers and culture,” “linguistic diversity,” and
“cultural differences in the way people communicate, move, and behav[e]”).
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formal sex education86 do not provide a curriculum substantively tailored to
meet the needs of people with intellectual disabilities.87 Furthermore, the
dominant messages and policy concerns in sex education are based on
managing the risks associated with sex and disability and preventing abuse
rather than on portraying sex as a positive good.
Effectively, the current doctrine of sexual incapacity creates a familiar
catch-22 for disenfranchised populations: the test requires knowledge and
appreciation of the consequences of sexual activity, yet it denies them
meaningful educational and experiential opportunities to meet this standard.88
The lives of people with ID/DD are highly regulated in return for economic
support and personal assistance, particularly if they live in institutional settings
such as nursing or group homes. In these settings, there is an absence of formal
and informal opportunities to amass knowledge about sex and its biological
consequences or to exercise sexual decision-making. Although older adults
may experience a similar lack of privacy and dearth of private spaces, they are
more likely to have experienced sexual decision-making prior to acquiring
cognitive impairments, as was true, for example, in the Donna Rayhons case.89
Third, and relatedly, the method of assessing knowledge and eliciting
information from people with intellectual and developmental disabilities may
require attention to the types of questions asked (e.g., leading questions may
not produce accurate information because of a tendency to please) and asking

86 As of March 1, 2016, twenty-four states and the District of Columbia require their

public schools to teach sex education. State Policies on Sex Education in Schools, NAT’L
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/statepolicies-on-sex-education-in-schools.aspx [https://perma.cc/SL3V-54TM].
87 Alison Boehning, Sex Education for Students with Disabilities, 1 L. & DISORDER
59, 59, 65 (2006), https://scholarworks.iu.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/2022/203/Boehning
%20sex%20education%20for%20students.pdf?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/3PAU-7UDF]
(noting that sex education is controversial in general, and becomes even more so when the
students in question have disabilities, and concluding that “sex education for America’s
disabled students is lacking”).
88 Conceptually, this resembles the position of blacks during the Jim Crow era who
were denied meaningful educational opportunities on the one hand and, on the other, were
presented with literacy tests as threshold barriers to exercising the right to vote. I do not
suggest that voting and sex are analogous, nor that the experience of people with ID/DD is
the same as blacks during Reconstruction. Rather, I raise this comparison to highlight
shared experiences of systematic denials of meaningful education constructing barriers to
the exercise of rights. See Gabriel J. Chin & Randy Wagner, The Tyranny of the Minority:
Jim Crow and the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 65, 92
(2008) (noting that because “literacy tests could be passed by educated citizens of any
color,” there was an incentive not to educate African-Americans—to do so “would be to
risk that they would vote”).
89 Boni-Saenz, supra note 1, at 1202–03, 1247–53 (discussing the case of Donna Ray,
a woman with Alzheimer’s disease, whose husband faced criminal charges for engaging in
sexual relations with her while her mental capacity to consent was in question).
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those questions in different ways over several sessions.90 This affects both the
process of the forensic assessment as well as any interviews, depositions, or
trial testimony elicited.

C. Supported Decision-Making
The practice of SDM in the context of people with ID/DD presents
challenges distinct from its operation in the context of older adults with
acquired impairments. As Boni-Saez notes, intellectual disability is an
umbrella term with internal variances based on capacity to communicate
(through words or conduct), physical mobility, severity of cognitive
impairment, and education level, to name a few elements.91 The use of SDM
as an alternative to forms of substituted decision-making, such as
guardianship, does not neglect the existence of impairments and the need for
support.92 Instead, the practice draws upon existing trusted networks of family,
friends, and professionals already in the lives of people with disabilities.93
Boni-Saenz’s novel third prong of the test for sexual incapacity assumes
that a support network exists and that it is willing and capable of identifying,
facilitating, and, if necessary, executing the decisional agency of the person
with an intellectual disability.94 For example, consider a single mother whose
son has cerebral palsy and cognitive impairments. The nineteen-year-old son
receives special education services at school and significant support from his
mother at home. Effectively non-verbal, he communicates through sounds and
behaviors known to his mother and some teachers at his school and is learning
to use an assistive communication device. On his eighteenth birthday, when
the educational decision-making rights transfer from mother to son, the school
district sends his mother a letter directing her to petition for guardianship in
order to continue to be involved in her son’s education.95 Her legal

90 STEPHEN ELLMANN ET AL., LAWYERS AND CLIENTS: CRITICAL ISSUES IN

INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING 109–39 (2009) (discussing the interview process of an
“atypical” client with diminished mental capacity and how to adjust questions
accordingly). See generally Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling:
Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501 (1990); Robert Dinerstein et al., Legal
Interviewing and Counseling: An Introduction, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 281 (2003); Stanley S.
Herr, Capacity for and Consent to Legal Representation, in A GUIDE TO CONSENT 77
(Robert Dinerstein et al. eds., 1999).
91 See Boni-Saenz, supra note 1, at 1212–13; Michael L. Wehmeyer & Shea
Obremski, Intellectual Disabilities, INT’L ENCYCLOPEDIA REHABILITATION (2010),
http://cirrie.buffalo.edu/encyclopedia/en/article/15/#content
[https://perma.cc/Y5SRVZP2].
92 See supra Part II.A.
93 Id.
94 Boni-Saenz, supra note 1, at 1235.
95 See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(D) (2006) (vesting the educational decision-making
rights of a child with a disability to parents or legal guardians); id. § 1415(m)(2) (same as
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representative recommends that she consider SDM as a less restrictive
alternative to guardianship. Does this young man have the legal capacity to
consent to using SDM? Does he have a meaningful choice in identifying his
supporter? Practically, his mother has been and will continue to be his
supporter. How does she determine her son’s will and preferences? Given the
level of support her son requires and his atypical communication, it is likely
that his mother will continue to make decisions on his behalf in his best
interests but with fewer records to show her decision-making role than if she
had a court order appointing her as her son’s guardian. How might such a
mother approach the issue of sexual decision-making and support on behalf of
her son? Empirical studies indicate high risk aversion and conservatism about
sexual expression shared by families and care workers of people with
intellectual and developmental disabilities.96
Take The Strange Case of Anna Stubblefield, as the New York Times
headline read.97 New Jersey tried and convicted Anna Stubblefield, a Rutgers
University professor, to twelve years in prison for sexually assaulting a thirtyyear-old man with severe physical and communication impairments, DJ, with
whom she claims to have had a romantic relationship.98 DJ lived with his coguardians, his mother and brother.99 His brother was a former student of
§ 1414(a)(1)(D), if the child does not “have the ability to provide informed consent”); 34
C.F.R. § 300.520 (2011) (same).
96 Beverley Clough, Vulnerability and Capacity to Consent to Sex – Asking the Right
Questions?, 26 CHILD & FAM. L.Q. 371, 385–86 (2014) (noting that current approaches to
sexual autonomy in the disability context over-emphasize sexual vulnerability, such that
the focus “becomes risk management and protection”); Nina A. Kohn, Matched
Preferences and Values: A New Approach to Selecting Legal Surrogates, 52 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 399, 408 (2015) (describing social science literature on incongruence in surrogate
decision-making and “the extensive literature on surrogate decisionmaking in the health
care context suggest[ing] that surrogate decisionmakers frequently make choices for
patients that are inconsistent with what the patients would have done”). Risk aversion is a
common theme in the disability context. For example, in the employment context, case law
suggests that employers are entitled to engage in risk-adverse behavior when it comes to
hiring persons with disabilities. See Russell Powell, Beyond Lane: Who Is Protected by the
Americans with Disabilities Act, Who Should Be?, 82 Denv. U. L. REV. 25, 35 (2004)
(noting that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the ADA allows employers to fire or
deny employment on the basis of paternalism). For example, in Chevron v. Echazabal, the
Supreme Court unanimously held that employers may terminate or decline to hire a person
whose disability poses a potential risk to the individual, even if no disability
accommodations are requested. Chevron v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 86 (2002)
(distinguishing between paternalism resulting in workplace discrimination and paternalism
as an employer’s mechanism of self-defense); Powell, supra, at 35.
97 Daniel Engber, The Strange Case of Anna Stubblefield, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Oct. 20,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/25/magazine/the-strange-case-of-annastubblefield.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/45Z8-PMNG].
98 Id.; Daniel Engber, What Anna Stubblefield Believed She Was Doing, N.Y. TIMES
MAG. (Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/03/magazine/what-annastubblefield-believed-she-was-doing.html [https://perma.cc/U5DV-NB3W].
99 Engber, supra note 97.
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Anna’s who approached her and requested her assistance in using assistive
communication methods with DJ.100 Anna’s academic scholarship touched on
“facilitated communication,” a method of physical support provided to the
arm, hands, and fingers of a person with physical and communication
impairments to assist them in the use of a type pad to express his or her
thoughts.101 In the course of working with DJ, Anna claims that they fell in
love and began a sexual relationship.102 After DJ and Anna approached his
mother and brother to disclose their relationship, the family eventually accused
Anna of rape and sexual assault, notified the police, and pursued
prosecution.103 The State advanced a theory of the case that Anna was a sexual
predator who took advantage of DJ, in part to advance her own career in
disability advocacy.104 Its most persuasive evidence, according to the jury, was
the presentation of DJ to the jury as demonstrative of his incapacity—the fact
that his mother carried him into the courtroom (although prior photos of DJ
suggest he uses a mechanical wheelchair), DJ’s proclivity to drool, and his
inability to verbally communicate.105 In fact, because the judge determined
that facilitated communication did not meet the rigorous evidentiary standards
in Daubert for scientific evidence, the jury never had an opportunity to hear
testimony or review documents about the use of facilitated communications
between Anna and DJ.106
In contrast, take the case of Henry and Donna Rayhons described by BoniSaenz in his article.107 Donna and Henry, a married couple, had a particular
relationship with a past record of consent to sex, pleasurable interactions
between them, knowledge of verbal and non-verbal communications, and no
evidence of coercion or abuse.108 Henry regularly visited Donna in her nursing
home and, according to Henry, Donna would indicate her desire to engage in
sexual conduct by saying, “[s]hall we play a bit?”109 Boni-Saenz recognizes,
“it is possible that [Donna] did not face a wide variety of relevant
consequences because of her age, condition, and context, and she might thus
satisfy” the knowledge and consequences prong of cognition-plus.110 Even if
she did not meet the second prong of the test, Boni-Saenz contends that her
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Engber, supra note 97.
106 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589–90 (1993); Engber, supra

note 97.
107 Boni-Saenz, supra note 1, at 1202.
108 Id. at 1252–53.
109 Id. at 1249; see also Bryan Gruley, Rape Case Asks If Wife with Dementia Can Say
Yes
to
Her
Husband,
BLOOMBERG
(Dec.
8,
2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-09/rape-case-asks-if-wife-withdementiacan-say-yes-to-her-husband [https://perma.cc/S7SZ-LPJ4].
110 Boni-Saenz, supra note 1, at 1251.
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sexual decision-making supporter, Henry, although in a position of potential
conflict, presented enough evidence to overcome a rebuttable presumption of
inadequacy given their relationship, history, and absence of evidence of force
or coercion.111 To the contrary, the evidence suggested that Donna did not
want the nursing home staff to prevent her from sexual conduct with her
husband.112
Unlike older adults who may have a more developed record of preferences
and past decision-making, people with intellectual disabilities, by definition,
have lifelong cognitive impairments that, for the reasons discussed in the Part
above, have not generated the types of experiences to develop will and
preferences. Furthermore, the people most likely to be their supporters are
parents or family members who may have particular risk-averse views about
sex and disability, or religious or cultural views about the appropriateness of
sexual activity.

IV. CONCLUSION
Boni-Saenz’s use of SDM as a way to decrease the number of people
found sexually incapacitated is a novel and exciting application of SDM.
Domestically, practitioners are currently experimenting with SDM models in
health care, education, and in the exercise of financial and parental rights
through advanced directives and other contractual models. SDM presents
opportunities for legal scholars across specialty areas—here elder law,
disability rights law, and international human rights—to push existing
normative boundaries and redefine legal capacity in our domestic laws. The
cognition-plus test for legal incapacity opens the door for greater recognition
of the decisional-agency of persons with cognitive disabilities; however, BoniSaenz continues to employ a functional approach to legal capacity that
excludes some individuals from equal recognition before the law. There are
also questions about how to define success and how to evaluate the
implementation of SDM.113 This Response suggests a number of
considerations for Boni-Saenz as he further develops his doctrinal test and
seeks to apply it to people with intellectual and developmental disabilities.

111 Id. at 1252–53.
112 Gruley, supra note 109.
113 See, e.g., Nina A. Kohn & Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Designating Health Care

Decisionmakers for Patients Without Advance Directives: A Psychological Critique, 42
GA. L. REV. 979, 995–1002 (2008) (questioning capacity of designated decision-makers to
execute the principal’s will and preferences); Nina A. Kohn et al., Supported DecisionMaking: A Viable Alternative to Guardianship?, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1111, 1129 (2013)
(arguing the lack of empirical data on the success of SDM systems weighs against its ready
adoption and prevents the development of empirically tested best practices).

